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Abstract 
Timeliness has been regularly identified as an essential characteristic of 
effective financial reporting, in both the public and private sectors. This paper 
systematically investigates the timeliness of Scottish local authority financial 
reports over the study period 1989-90 to 1995-96. It considers how audit lags 
can be measured and provides descriptive statistics, before setting out its 
empirical methodology. It innovates in terms of using Fixed Effects regressions 
and of then reformulating the problem in terms of non-compliance with externally 
imposed ceilings on audit lags, so that Logit regressions can be estimated. 
The regression results on audit lag provide a reasonably consistent picture, 
whether using OLS or Fixed Effects methodology. The auditing variables are 
shown to be important: audit lag increases when there is an audit qualification, 
when there is a change in auditor, and when the audit is done by the Accounts 
Commission (a public body), rather than a private auditor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Timeliness has been regularly identified as an essential characteristic of effective financial 
reporting, in both the public and private sectors (Drebin, Chan and Ferguson, 1981). The 
financial reporting of UK public bodies has increasingly moved away from cash accounting 
towards the adoption of commercial accounting principles (UK GAAP), though somewhat 
modified to reflect particular public sector circumstances and not necessarily consistent across 
the public sector. There is a considerable literature on the role of local authority financial 
reporting, viewing annual reports and accounts as a mechanism of accountability between 
local authorities and their citizen-taxpayers. Much emphasis has been placed upon whether 
local authorities complied with relevant regulations and standards, and with the degree of 
uniformity of published accounts (Jones and Pendlebury, 1982; Chandler and Cook, 1986; 
Jones and Pendlebury, 1991). Bowerman and Gray (1999) examined the role of the 
management letters prepared by auditors, though not publicly disclosed. One of the themes 
emerging from this body of research has been the difficulty of identifying users of UK local 
authority financial reports (Jones, 1992; Lapsley, 1992), with it becoming clear that the 
presumed wider user community may not exist (Butterworth, Gray and Haslam, 1989). 
Scotland, one of the constituent countries of the United Kingdom, has always had a local 
government system structurally different from that in England, and which has been controlled 
from Edinburgh rather than London. Nevertheless, though there are some institutional 
differences in audit regulation, accounting regulations are largely uniform across the United 
Kingdom, not least because of the role of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy, the professional body to which many local authority accountants belong. 
Financial reporting in Scottish local authorities in the late 1980s was researched in a series 
of papers (Kilgour and Lapsley, 1988; Collins, Keenan and Lapsley, 1991) published jointly 
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland and the Scottish branch of the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. The concerns about a lack of uniformity and 
consistency echoed the findings about England. 
Having studied annual reports and accounts for the two financial years 1984-85 and 1985-
86, Kilgour and Lapsley (1988) conducted a postal questionnaire of finance officers and 
auditors. Although they mentioned that 'there has been some slippage' in closing the accounts 
by 31 August, the dates on which the annual accounts were certified by the auditors were not 
examined. It was noted that the accounts were produced some time after the financial year 
end, but this issue was not pursued. Collins, Keenan et al. (1991, p. 38) reported that more 
timely information 'was not raised by any of the interested parties' that they contacted, 'but, 
in our view, earlier dissemination of reports would improve their relevance'. 
This paper systematically investigates the issue of timeliness in Scottish local authority financial 
reports. In the 1980s and 1990s, the relationship between central government and local 
authorities in Scotland severely deteriorated, as manifested in disputes about tax and 
expenditure limitation powers held by the Scottish Office, and about Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering of the provision of local authority services. This conflict culminated in a 
reorganisation of local government on 1 April 1996 (Himsworth, 1995; Midwinter, 1995), 
which was imposed by the Scottish Office and not consensual in the way in which the previous 
1975 reorganisation had been. A major exercise in document collection succeeded in acquiring 
the annual accounts of all 65 local authorities for the period 1989-90 to 1995-96 (the last 
year of the local authorities established in 1975). 
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The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 examines the question of timeliness, 
first considering how audit lags can be measured and then providing descriptive statistics on 
Scottish local authorities during the study period. Section 3 summarises relevant research 
on audit lags, considering both the empirical methodology and the variables found to be 
statistically significant. Section 4 sets out the empirical methodology of this paper, highlighting 
how it innovates in terms of using Fixed Effects regressions (Hsiao, 1986; Baltagi, 1995) and 
of then reformulating the problem in terms of non-compliance with externally imposed ceilings 
on audit lags, so that Logit regressions can be estimated. 
Section 5 reports the regression results generated by the different approaches: Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS); Fixed Effects; and Logit. Section 6 draws conclusions from the models 
and discusses further avenues of research. 
TIMELINESS 
The Measure of Timeliness 
The term 'audit lag' is defined as the period, in months, between the end ofthe financial year 
and the date when the auditor signed the audit certificate. The date normally appears below 
or beside the auditor's signature, though it was sometimes difficult to locate signed copies. 
This period represents the length of time taken for the annual accounts to be prepared by the 
council, and then audited and certified by the auditor. 
The authors prefer to use the term 'audit lag' because 'audit delay' seems to automatically 
imply a lack of punctuality. Accounts must be prepared and audited after the end of the 
financial year; audit lag is a more neutral term than audit delay. For example, the Royal Bank 
of Scotland would reasonably be offended if it were reported that its audit delay was 'three 
months', because obviously bank staff need time to prepare the accounts and the auditor 
needs time to audit them before signing the audit certificate. In the empirical work, the authors 
avoid the term 'reporting lag' because it is impossible to know when a local authority published 
its accounts in a particular year. Councils do not make formal announcements of publication. 
Figure 1 
The Audit and Reporting Lags of Slowtown Council 
Researcher can only observe A + B 
1 April 1993 
First day after 
financial year end 
31 August 1993 
Deadline to submit 
Abstract of Account 
to the auditor and 
Controller of Audit 
30 December 1993 
Auditor receives 
accounts 
26 July 1994 
Account certified 
14 September 
1994 
Account Published 
Notes 
* Phase A is handled by the Council 
* Phase B is handled by the Auditor, but the time taken depends not only on Auditor competence but also on the quality of the Council's 
work at Phase A and issues giving rise to possible Auditor qualifications. 
* Date on which the accounts are sent to the auditor is not in public domain 
* Management letters are not in the public domain, but material from them sometimes leaks into the public domain. 
* Phase C is handled by the Council 
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Figure 1 illustrates schematically the components of the reporting lag for the hypothetical 
Slowtown Council, assuming all dates are known. It shows the process of final accounts 
preparation from the first day after the financial year end until they finally reach the public 
domain. The components of the reporting lag consist of phases A, B and C. Phase A runs 
from 1 April until 30 December 1993.1 April 1993 is the first day after the end of the 1992- 93 
financial year, ie the first day of the 1993-94 financial year. The local authority is required to 
submit the abstract of accounts for the 1992-93 financial year to the Controller of Audit (a 
public official) and to the appointed auditor by 31 August 1993. This deadline is marked by 
the vertical dotted line. 
In this example of Slowtown Council, the auditor received the accounts on 30 December 
1993, four months late. The annual accounts were audited from that day and were finally 
certified on 26 July 1994. This phase, between 30 December 1993 and 26 July 1994, is 
marked as B. The date on which the auditor signed the accounts allows the calculation of 
audit lags. The certification date is the only date in Figure 1 that can be reliably and accurately 
observed. For example, the precise date of submitting the accounts to the auditor is not 
known, so the time taken to audit the accounts is also not known. Moreover, the time needed 
to audit the accounts will depend on the competence and experience of the auditor, and 
upon the quality of the accounts prepared by the council. If there are many errors in these 
draft accounts, the auditor will take longer before certifying them, not least because 
issues will need to be discussed at higher management levels. 
On the basis of the available data, it is not possible to allocate responsibility for delays 
between councils and auditors, though the dispersion of audit lags strongly suggests that 
primary responsibility rests with individual councils. 
Phase C, namely the period between the accounts being certified by the auditors and the 
time they reach the public domain, is not known due to the lack of a formal announcement of 
publication. In Figure 1, it is represented as the period between 26 July 1994 and 14 September 
1994. This phase is entirely the responsibility of the local authority. Even if better information 
were available, there is the issue of what constitutes publication. After the full council approves 
the annual report and accounts, printed copies are physically made available to the public at 
council offices; there is no official announcement of publication. In this Slowtown example, 
the annual report and accounts were published on 14 September 1994. It is impractical to 
trace the exact date of publication for all local authorities in Scotland. 
Mathematically, the reporting lag (A+B+C) must be equal to, or greater than, the audit lag 
(A+B). To summarise, Phase A is entirely dealt with by the council. Phase B is conducted by 
the auditor but the work involved depends in part on the quality of work in Phase A. Finally, 
Phase C once again is the responsibility of the local authority. The only practicable method 
of calculating lags for empirical work is to look at the date shown on the audit certificate and 
then calculate the audit lag. The shorter the audit lag, the sooner the annual report and 
audited financial statements are likely to have reached the public domain. 
Descriptive Statistics on Timeliness 
Timeliness was not a characteristic of the financial reporting of Scottish local authorities over 
the study period of 1989-90 to 1995-96. The first year of the study period is arbitrary; there 
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are practical limits as to how far back in time it is possible to collect annual accounts. The last 
year of 1995-96 represents the final year of existence of the local authorities established in 
1975, there being a fundamental reorganisation (except for the three island councils) on 1 
April 1996. Undoubtedly, the 86% year-on-year increase in the mean audit lag for 1995-96 
was substantially attributable to the impact of this reorganisation; closing the 1995-96 accounts 
of the abolished councils had become the responsibility of designated successor councils. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on Audit Lags, 1989-90 to 1995-96 
Audit lags 
Maximum 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of 
variation 
1989-90 
3.08 
31.87 
10.9 
5.7 
0.52 
1990-91 
4.2 
27.9 
11.07 
4.71 
0.43 
1991-92 
4.4 
21.77 
10.43 
4.13 
0.4 
1992-93 
3.05 
23.8 
9.75 
3.39 
0.35 
1993-94 
3.94 
18.79 
9.84 
3.61 
0.37 
1994-95 
4.3 
15.38 
9.22 
2.3 
0.25 
1995-96 
6.82 
31.84 
17.18 
5.5 
0.32 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the study period. The most striking point is the 
range of audit lags: the lowest minimum (3.05 months in 1992-93) was only 9.56 % of the 
highest maximum (31.87 months in 1989-90). The persistence of wide ranges, together with 
individual authority data showing persistence in both timeliness and lack of timeliness, rules 
out task difficulty as a major explanation of differential audit lag. Figure 2 plots for each of the 
seven years the percentage of accounts remaining to be certified at specified months after 
the end of the financial year. Months are plotted along the top of the graph, so that year 
labels can be attached to the individual lines. There is considerable bunching of the first six 
years, but with 1995-96 displaced to the right. The intercepts with the horizontal axis show 
improvements over time if the criterion is the last to be certified, with 1995-96 the obvious 
exception. 
Table 2 presents the data in terms of the cumulative percentage of councils that have had 
their accounts certified within three-month bands, after an initial six-month band. The summary 
data present the distribution of means including, and excluding, 1995-96 (the year most 
affected by reorganisation). Over the period 1989-90 to 1995-96, only 9.5% of accounts had 
been certified within six months; 69.5% within 12 months; and 2.9% remained uncertified 
after 24 months. 
Taken together, the evidence presented in Table 1 and Table 2, supplemented by the graphical 
representation in Figure 2, shows that there was a serious lack of timeliness in Scottish local 
authority financial reporting in the 1990s. Moreover, examination of the reporting records of 
individual councils revealed marked and sustained variations in performance, thereby enabling 
regression techniques to be adopted in order to investigate the causes of untimeliness. 
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Table 2 
Cumulative Audit Lags for Scottish Local Authorities, 1989-90 to 1995-96 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
Distribution of means 
(including 95-96) 
Distribution of means 
(excluding 95-96) 
Accounts audited by 
end of period 
Cumulative Audit Lags (months) 
0-6 
9 
13.80% 
4 
6.20% 
8 
12.30% 
6 
9.20% 
8 
12.30% 
8 
12.30% 
0 
0.00% 
2 
3.10% 
3 
4.60% 
0-9 
31 
47.70% 
28 
43.10% 
32 
49.20% 
32 
49.20% 
36 
55.40% 
29 
44.60% 
4 
6.20% 
14 
21.50% 
26 
40.00% 
0-12 
49 
75.40% 
46 
70.80% 
47 
72.30% 
52 
80% 
52 
80% 
61 
93.80% 
9 
13.80% 
45 
69.20% 
52 
80% 
0-15 
55 
84.60% 
57 
87.70% 
56 
86.20% 
61 
93.80% 
58 
89.20% 
64 
98.50% 
26 
40.00% 
58 
89.20% 
60 
92.30% 
0-18 
58 
89.20% 
59 
90.80% 
60 
92.30% 
64 
98.50% 
63 
96.90% 
65 
100.00% 
45 
69.20% 
64 
98.50% 
64 
98.50% 
0-21 
59 
90.80% 
62 
95.40% 
64 
98.50% 
64 
98.50% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
50 
76.90% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
0-24 
62 
95.40% 
63 
96.60% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
57 
87.70% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
Total 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
65 
100.00% 
Cumulative Accounts Audited by Period (months) 
43 
9.50% 
192 
42.20% 
316 
69.50% 
377 
82.90% 
414 
91% 
429 
94.30% 
442 
97.10% 
455 
100% 
Figure 2 
Audit Lags, 1989/90 to 1995/96 
12.0 18.0 
Months 
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PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
No regression-based study of the timeliness of UK local authority financial reports has been 
located. Previous UK empirical work has concentrated upon compliance with extant accounting 
standards and regulations. However, there is empirical work on audit lags in the private 
sector and in US municipalities. The following discussion first considers empirical methodology 
and then reviews which variables have been shown to be statistically significant in regressions 
on audit lags. 
Dyer and McHugh (1975) reported a questionnaire-based survey of the factors behind the 
audit lags of quoted Australian companies in the period 1965-71, providing descriptive statistics 
but not estimating a regression model. Dwyer and Wilson (1989) reported a study of US 
municipalities in 1982, estimating OLS models. Ng and Tai (1994) reported a study of Hong 
Kong quoted companies in 1990 and 1991, estimating OLS models. Johnson (1996; 1998) 
estimated OLS models for audit lags in 289 US local governments. He also used the predictive 
values of audit fees, from an OLS model of audit fees, as an instrumental variable in Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) models of audit lags. Jaggi and Tsui (1999) used OLS on 
pooled data for 1991-93 for Hong Kong quoted companies. McLelland and Giroux (2000) 
ran OLS regressions on audit lag in large US municipalities in 1996. None of these studies 
estimated Fixed Effects models. 
The studies listed above have been conducted on different populations and a discussion of 
which variables were shown to be statistically significant has to proceed with caution, not 
least because of the differences in contexts and time periods. In Ng and Tai's (1994) Hong 
Kong study, separate OLS regressions were run for 1990 and 1991. The significant variables 
in 1990 were the log of the turnover (expected negative sign, at 1 %); year end (positive sign, 
5%); and the number of principal subsidiaries expected positive sign, at 1%). For 1991, 
extraordinary items (expected positive sign, at 5%) replaced year end in otherwise similar 
results. 
In Johnson's (1996) paper, the OLS regression found the following variables to be significant: 
constant (positive sign, at 1%); the local government being awarded a Government Finance 
Officers'Association Certificate for good financial reporting (expected negative sign, at 1%); 
September 30 financial year end (expected negative sign, at 1%); the involvement of more 
than one auditor (expected positive sign, at 1 %); the State auditor influences the independent 
audit (expected positive sign, at 1 %); the audit fee is computed on a cost-plus basis (expected 
positive sign, at 10%); and 'local government is a city' (expected negative sign, at 5%). In 
Johnson's (1998) 2SLS regressions, the variables statistically significant for audit lag were 
the following: September 30 financial year end (expected negative sign, at 10%); and the 
involvement of more than one auditor (expected positive sign, at 5%). 
In the McLelland and Giroux (2000) study of US municipalities, the following variables are 
statistically significant in the OLS regressions on audit lag: comprehensive annual financial 
report (negative sign, at 1%); disclosure of additional audit reports (expected negative sign, 
at 5%); IT investment (expected negative sign, at 1 %); audit opinion (expected positive sign, 
at 10%); logarithm of population (expected positive sign, at 1 %); independent auditor (expected 
negative sign, at 1%); the involvement of more than one auditor (expected positive sign, at 
1%); State regulations (expected positive sign, at 10%); and Federal regulatory requirements 
(expected positive sign, at 10%). 
^ ^ 
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EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Specification of variables 
The choice of variables was influenced by previous regression studies and by the accounting 
literature, conditioned by knowledge of the Scottish local authority system. There are four 
groupings of variables. The first grouping relates to the structural and demographic 
characteristics of local authorities, factors outside local control. Census 1991 population is 
used as the measure of local authority size, with the expectation that larger authorities will 
be able to afford better-qualified finance departments. The expected sign is therefore negative. 
The District dummy distinguishes district councils (the lower tier in a two-tier system on the 
Scottish mainland) from the regional councils (the upper tier) and the all-purpose island 
councils. The rationale is that regional and island councils would be able to attract better 
quality staff and councillors; the expected sign on the District dummy is therefore positive. 
The final set of variables within this grouping are four dummy variables taken from the Office 
of National Statistics (ONS) classification of local authorities in Great Britain, a system based 
on cluster analysis (Wallace and Denham, 1996). There are marked differences among 
Scottish local authority areas and it was expected that, for example, councils in prosperous 
areas would perform better than councils in declining areas. These ONS variables should 
make it possible to separate the effects of political control (which may change through time) 
and socio-demographic characteristics (which change slowly). In the regressions, ONSR 
(Rural) is the omitted dummy variable. A positive sign is expected on ONSI (Industry); negative 
signs are expected on ONSM (Maturer) and ONSP (Prospering); and there is no expectation 
on ONSU (Urban). 
The second grouping relates to political control and to political competition. Throughout the 
study period, the Scottish Office was under the control of a Conservative Secretary of State 
for Scotland (a post in the UK Cabinet), at a time when Conservative representation from 
Scotland in the Westminster Parliament had fallen sharply. In this polarised environment, 
there was much conflict between the Scottish Office and local authorities. Party control is 
hypothesised to affect audit lag. A positive sign is expected for Labour councils, either because 
of complacency (in some councils, Labour dominates completely) or general antagonism to 
the Scottish Office. A negative sign is expected for Conservative councils, owing to a sense 
of loyalty to the Conservative Secretary of State. Because there are few such cases, the 
councils controlled by the third and fourth parties (Scottish National Party and Liberal 
Democrats) were combined together. In both cases, there is an expectation of a 'flagship' 
effect (ie negative sign), as these parties seek to demonstrate their competence to govern. A 
negative sign is also expected for councils for which there is no overall control (NOC), which 
can itself be viewed as an indicator of political competition. There is also a dummy variable 
representing a more direct attempt to measure political competition, namely whether the 
political control status of the council changed during the study period. Again, the expectation 
is that political competition will reduce audit lag. These political variables are not measured 
as well as the authors would have hoped. Surprisingly, there is no systematic database of 
which party controls Scottish councils in particular years, meaning that reliance has to be 
placed on periodic election results, with changes in control between elections being 
unrecorded. 
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The third grouping relates to accounting and audit. Examination of the data indicated that 
there were a large number of audit qualifications (AQ) and comments short of audit 
qualifications (CSAQ), and that the incidence of these varied markedly across councils. The 
expectation is that audit lags will be longer when there are audit qualifications or comments 
short of audit qualifications. The auditors of Scottish local authorities are appointed by a 
public body known as the Accounts Commission for Scotland, with the work being split between 
its own staff and private auditors. The expectation is that audit lag will be longer when the 
Accounts Commission is the auditor (ACAUD); the expected sign is positive. At least three 
different interpretations could be placed on such a finding: the Accounts Commission is 
more thorough than private auditors; it keeps the most troublesome cases inhouse; or it is 
less efficient than private auditors. A change of auditor (CHAUD) is expected to increase 
audit lag, owing to a 'new broom' effect in the first year. Partly for data reasons, CHAUD 
denotes a change of audit firm, not the change of audit partner within the same firm, or 
changes of Accounts Commission auditor. The final variable in this grouping is whether the 
Director of Finance (more strictly, the person signing the annual accounts) is a chartered 
accountant (CA). The expectation is that chartered accountants, trained outside the public 
sector, would be more insistent on timeliness because of their private sector experience. 
Accountants trained within the public sector may have become accustomed to untimeliness 
and to the lack of consequences attached to it. 
The fourth grouping consists of five year dummies. In the study, 1989-90 was dropped so 
that the CHAUD variable could be used. The base for the year dummies is 1990-91. The 
year dummies relate to 1991-92 (DUMMY92) to 1995-96 (DUMMY96). Audit lags are expected 
to reduce after 1990-91 because the Accounts Commission had exerted pressure on councils 
to reduce audit lags. The year dummies up to and including DUMMY95 are expected to be 
negative. In contrast, accounts for 1995-96 were prepared by the successor authorities, 
themselves preoccupied with establishing their own financial systems, and an examination 
of the data made it clear that audit lags increased dramatically for that year. DUMMY96 is 
therefore expected to be positive. 
In some of the regression models, there is an extra variable (LAG1) which is the audit lag in 
the preceding year. Examination of the data suggested that there is a 'habit' effect. Local 
authorities which are slow in year t are also slow in year t+1, either because delays are not 
thought important or because delay breeds delay on logistical grounds. The analysis in Table 
2 indicates that a considerable percentage of councils have not had the accounts of year t 
certified at the beginning of year t+2 (ie audit lag is longer than 12 months). 
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Table 3 
Justification of Variables in Audit Lag Regressions, 1989/90 to 1995/96 
Variable 
Population 
District dummy 
Distrist =1 
Regional, Island =0 
ONSRural dummy 
Rural =1 
Others=0 
ONSProspering 
dummy 
Prosperous=1 
Others=0 
ONSMaturer dummy 
Maturer =1 
Others =0 
ONSIndustry dummy 
Industry =1 
Others = 0 
LAB control 
Labour = 1 
Others = 0 
CON control 
Conservative 
control = 1 
Others = 0 
LIBDEM control 
Liberal Democrat 
control =1 
Others = 0 
SNP Control 
Scottish National 
Party control = 1 
Others = 0 
Independent 
Control =1 
Others = 0 
AQORCSAQ 
Audit Qualification or 
Comments Short of 
Audit Qualification = 1 
Others = 0 
Expected 
Sign 
negative 
positive 
positive 
negative 
negative 
positive 
positive 
negative 
No expectation 
negative 
No expectation 
positive 
Rationale 
larger authorities will have better 
staffed finance departments 
regional & island authorities have 
been said to attract better quality 
staff and councillors 
rural authorities are somewhat 
isolated from the mainstream 
authorities in prospering areas will 
be better managed generally, 
reflecting a high level of self-
confidence 
authorities in maturer areas 
will be better managed 
generally, reflecting a high 
level of self-confidence 
authorities in declining areas 
will be less well managed 
generally, partly because 
they have overwhelming 
problems 
complacency effect 
loyalty effect 
flagship effect 
Review process is likely to be more 
time-consuming (Not considered 
yet is whether these refer to 
Financial Reporting or to Breach of 
Statutory Duty) 
Confidence In Sign 
low 
low 
low 
low 
low 
low 
moderate 
moderate 
moderate 
high 
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AQ 
Audit Qualification = 1 
Others = 0 
CSAQ 
Comments on Short of 
Audit Qualification =1 
Others = 0 
ACAUD Year dummy 
Accounts Commission 
= 1 
Private auditors = 0 
CHAUD 
Change Auditor = 1 
Others = 0 
DUMMY92, 
DUMMY93, 
DUMMY94, 
DUMMY95, 
DUMMY96 
DUMMY92=1 if 
accounts for the year 
of 1992 and other 
years =0, 
Likewise if accounts 
for the year of 1993, 
thenDUMMY93 = 1, 
other years = 0. 
positive 
positive 
positive 
positive 
Negative for 
all years except 
for 1996. 
Review process is likely to be 
more time-consuming (Not 
considered yet is whether these refer 
to Financial Reporting or to 
Breach of Statutory Duty) 
Review process is likely to be more 
time-consuming (Not considered yet 
is whether these refer to Financial 
Reporting or to Breach of Statutory 
Duty) 
either: Accounts Commission keeps 
the most troublesome cases in-house, 
or it is less efficient than private 
auditing firms 
'New broom' effect 
Audit lags are expected to reduce 
after 1991; and 1996 is the year 
of reorganisation, so the 
accounts are expected to 
be delayed 
high 
high 
moderate 
high 
high 
Table 3 summarises the variables that will be used in the regressions. The researchers' prior 
expectations of expected signs are stated, as are the justification and level of confidence 
they held in the expected sign. For completeness, the omitted base dummy variables on 
ONS authority classification, political control and year are included in the table. 
^ ^ 
MALAYSIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, VOLUME 3 NO. 1, 2004 
Table 4 
Model Summary 
Model 
1A 
1B 
2A 
2B 
3A 
3B 
4A 
4B 
Regression 
OLS 
OLS 
Fixed Effects 
Fixed Effects 
Restricted OLS 
Restricted OLS 
Logit 
Logit 
Dependent 
Variable 
Audit Lags 
Audit Lags 
Audit Lags 
Audit Lags 
Audit Lags 
Audit Lags 
Non-compliance 
with deadline 
(binary variable) 
Non-compliance 
with deadline 
(binary variable) 
Comment 
This is the full OLS model 
Same as 1A but with lagged dependent variable 
The time-invariant regressors have to be 
dropped, and the number of variables has been 
greatly reduced 
Same as 2A but with lagged dependent variable 
This OLS model is run for comparative purposes, 
using the same variables as model 2A 
This OLS model is run for comparative purposes, 
using the same variables as model 2B 
This looks at the problem from a different 
perspective and checks for lack of 
compliance with the auditing deadline 
Same as 4A but with lagged dependent variable 
Regression models 
An overview of the empirical methodology is provided in Table 4. There are four pairs of 
models, each labelled A (when there is no lagged dependent variable) and B (when there is 
a lagged dependent variable). The first three pairs have audit lag as the dependent variable, 
whereas the fourth pair represents a redefinition of the problem, namely that of noncompliance 
with the central government deadline for certification. In all eight models, 1989- 90 has been 
dropped so that the Change of Auditor (CHAUD) variable can be used. 
The three pairs of regressions on audit lags are complementary. The first pair (1A and 1B) is 
the 'Full OLS' models, pooled regressions on all the variables. These models impose the 
same constant on all councils. 
The second pair (2A and 2B) is the Fixed Effects models. The rationale for adopting Fixed 
Effects as a regression methodology is that observation of the data suggests that there are 
certain attributes of individual local authorities, perhaps managerial efficiency or commitment 
to timeliness in financial reporting, which are not captured by the independent variables 
used in the models. The Fixed Effects model drops the assumption of a common constant, 
and instead estimates a constant for each local authority. The disadvantage of adopting 
Fixed Effects is that all time-invariant independent variables have to be dropped, thereby 
losing certain variables shown to be significant in the OLS models. 
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The third pair of models ('Restricted OLS') is presented so that a proper comparison can be 
made between the Fixed Effects results (models 2Aand 2B) and the OLS results (models 3A 
and 3B) on the same restricted set of variables. 
The fourth pair (4A and 4B) is Logit regressions on whether the official deadline for certification 
is met. If councils did not see intrinsic value in timeliness, the issue could be reformulated in 
terms of whether or not there is compliance with the externally imposed deadline. It would 
not be judged worthwhile devoting extra resources to completing earlier than the deadline, 
and, once the deadline has been breached, a long breach might not be regarded as much 
worse than a short one. In the study years, the official deadline for certification was 31 
August, except for 1995-96 when there was a temporary relaxation to 31 October, as a result 
of the local government reorganisation on 1 April 1996. 
Table 5 
Results of Audit Lag Regressions 
Variable 
Constant 
Pop91 
Dist 
ONSI 
ONSM 
ONSP 
ONSU 
LAB 
CON 
LIBorSNP 
NOC 
Polcomp 
AQ 
CSAQ 
Model 1A 
11.4414** 
(13.926) 
-(13.926) 
0.0012 
-(1.173) 
-1.2853 
-(1.962) 
-0.9142 
-(0.958) 
1.7691 
-(1.461) 
-1.284 
-(1.973) 
0.2297 
-(0.258) 
-0.7225 
-(0.736) 
0.0128 
-(0.015) 
-2.5426 
-(3.052) 
0.8479 
-(1.026) 
-1.4435 
-(2.775) 
2.3075 
-(4.560) 
0.1919 
-(0.350) 
Model 1B 
5.0650** 
5.942) 
-(5.942) 
0.0016 
-(1.698) 
-0.5496 
-(0.955) 
-0.0192 
-(0.021) 
0.9873 
(0.762) 
-0.552 
-(0.919) 
0.5828 
-(0.698) 
-0.5435 
-(0.606) 
0.101 
-(0.143) 
-1.6901 
-(2.364) 
0.262 
-(0.335) 
-0.4994 
-(1.045) 
0.8584 
-(1.744) 
0.2576 
(0.5320 
Model 2A 
0.4549 
(0.271) 
3.0168 
(1.559) 
-3.5562 
(-2.698) 
1.3562 
-(0.890) 
1.5425 
(2.890) 
0.2049 
(0.390) 
Model 2B 
-0.2477 
(-.148) 
1.8454 
-(0.973) 
-2.5538 
(-2.085) 
0.6628 
-(0.442) 
0.9715 
(1.787) 
0.2992 
(0.603) 
Model 3A 
10.0810** 
-(16.805) 
-0.9831 
(-1.916) 
-1.2972 
(-1.848) 
-4.12 
(-5.932) 
-0.5902 
(-1.069) 
2.811 
-(5.645) 
0.5079 
(0.897) 
Model 3B 
4.2676** 
(17.076) 
(7.235) 
0.0024 
(0.006) 
-0.2507 
(-0.416) 
-2.0893 
(-3.414) 
0.1454 
-(0.306) 
0.9784 
-(1.990) 
0.4684 
(0.940) 
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ACAUD 
CHAUD 
CA 
Lag1 
DUMMY92 
DUMMY93 
DUMMY94 
DUMMY95 
DUMMY96 
Observations 
Breausch-Pagan Statistic 
Corrected for heteroskedasticity 
Adjusted R2 
F-Statistic 
Fixed Effects 
0.9518 
(-2.356) 
1.3918 
(-1.6630 
-0.1911 
(-0.3060) 
-0.1214 
(-0.195) 
-2.0304 
(-2,121) 
-0.6923 
(-1.15) 
-1.4505 
(-2.463) 
6.5355 
(-7.73) 
390 
104.0157 
Yes 
0.43567 
15.3 
No 
0.4564 
(-1.36) 
1.8493 
(-2.988) 
-0.5186 
(-1.034) 
0.5229 
(-10.453) 
-0.265 
(-0.549) 
-2.0917 
(-3.122) 
-0.1953 
(-0.431) 
-1.042 
(-2.271) 
7.2309 
(-9.57) 
390 
142.9822 
Yes 
0.58898 
26.34 
No 
0.9283 
(-2.272) 
1.6441 
(-2.363) 
-1.0476 
(-1.185) 
-0.1303 
(-0.276) 
-2.2013 
(-3.011) 
-0.7553 
(-1.575) 
-1.5266 
(-3.033) 
6.4157 
(-8.455) 
390 
Not repoted 
Yes 
0.55084 
7.12 
Yes 
0.6186 
(-1.571) 
1.8245 
(-2.901) 
-1.1058 
(-1.311) 
0.3305 
(-4.875) 
-0.2061 
(-0.472) 
-2.169 
(-3.333) 
-0.4286 
(-0.977) 
-1.2455 
(-2.69) 
6.869 
(-9.621) 
390 
Not repoted 
Yes 
0.58881 
8.05 
Yes 
0.8786 
(-2.173) 
1.2858 
(-1.512) 
0.118 
(-0.202) 
-0.0817 
(-0.128) 
-1.8213 
(-1.877) 
-0.567 
(-0.916) 
-1.3264 
(-2.255) 
6.5796 
(-7.698) 
390 
82.8367 
Yes 
0.40515 
19.92 
No 
0.5171 
(-1.565) 
1.725 
(-2.835) 
-0.732 
(-0.584) 
0.5446 
(-11.248) 
-0.2764 
(-0.572) 
-1.9493 
(-2.946) 
-0.1546 
(-0.339) 
-1.03 
(-2.295) 
7.1988 
-9.411 
390 
142.2511 
Yes 
0.57871 
36.62 
No 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 5 reports the results from the first three pairs of regressions, namely the Full OLS 
models (1Aand 1B), the Fixed Effects models (2Aand 2B), and the Restricted OLS models 
(3A and 3B) run solely for comparative purposes. In all six models, the t ratios have been 
corrected for heteroskedasticity by using White's standard errors. 
Full OLS models 
Model lAisthe Full OLS model, without a lagged dependent variable. The following variables 
are statistically significant: constant (1%, expected positive sign), ONSP (5%, expected 
negative sign), LIBorSNP (1%, expected negative sign); Polcomp (1%, expected negative 
sign); AQ (1%, expected positive sign); ACAUD (5%, expected positive sign); DUMMY93 
(5%, expected negative sign); DUMMY95 (5%, expected negative sign); and DUMMY96 
(1%, expected positive sign). Apart from ONSP and LIBorSNP, the ONS and party-political 
variables perform poorly. The District variable just misses 5%, though with an unexpected 
negative sign. The Adjusted R2 is 0.44. The F-test shows that Model 1A is significant at the 
1% level. 
Model 1B introduces audit lag in the previous year as a dependent variable. Unreported 
regressions used lags of more than one year, but these variables were never significant 
when the one-year lag was also included. The rationale for introducing the lagged dependent 
variable is that persistence in local authority performance can be observed in the raw data. 
We would expect that introducing the lagged dependent variable would detract from the 
significance of other variables. For example, it was hypothesised in Table 3 that a complacency 
effect on the part of Labour-controlled councils would increase audit lag. If this had been 
sustained by Model 1A (in fact, the sign is wrong and also insignificant), this would have led 
Labour councils to have, ceteris paribus, longer audit lags. 
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In Model 1B, LIBorSNP (down from 1% to 5%), DUMMY93 (up from 5% to 1%) and DUMMY95 
(5%) keep their expected negative signs. Polcomp now has a much lower negative coefficient 
and loses its significance entirely. DUMMY96 keeps its expected positive significance (1%) 
but AQ (down from 1%) and ACAUD (down from 5%) lose theirs. The most important change 
is that the positive coefficient on the constant drops sharply (though remaining significant at 
1%), with the lagged dependent variable (Lag1) being significant at 1% with a coefficient of 
0.5229. Another change is the CHAUD variable, which moves from being not significant at 
5% to being significant at 1%, having the expected positive sign. The Adjusted R2 has risen 
to 0.59. 
Reviewing Models 1A and 1B, it can be seen that the demographic and political variables 
(with the exception of LIBorSNP, Polcomp and ONSP in Model 1A) have performed 
disappointingly. Certain year dummies are important. AQ and ACAUD are significant when 
there is no lagged dependent variable, and CHAUD when there is. LAG1 dominates Model 
1B: 52% of the variation in the dependent variable is attributable to it, in a regression which 
explains 59% of the variation. 
Fixed effects models 
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 report the Fixed Effects results, Model 2A without the 
lagged dependent variable and Model 2B with it. In Fixed Effects regressions, the time-
invariant variables must be dropped for technical reasons. The constant is dropped, with 
individual Fixed Effects being estimated for each council. 
Model 2A has an Adjusted R2 of 0.55; the F-statistic shows that the model is overall significant 
at 1 %. The following variables are statistically significant: LIBorSNP (1 %, expected negative 
sign); AQ (1%, expected positive sign); ACAUD (5%, expected positive sign); CHAUD (5%, 
expected positive sign); DUMMY93 and DUMMY95 (1%, expected negative sign); and 
DUMMY96 (1%, expected positive sign). With the ONSP and Polcomp variables dropped 
because they are time-invariant, the other variables significant in Model 1A are also significant 
in Model 2A, at the same level of significance or higher. The CHAUD variable, which was not 
significant in Model 1 A, becomes significant at 5%. 
Introducing the lagged dependent variable in Model 2B improves the Adjusted R2 from 0.55 
to 0.59. The F-statistic demonstrates the overall significance of the model at 1%. LAG1 has 
a coefficient of 0.3305, significant at 1 %. Two variables which were statistically significant in 
Model 2A lose that significance: AQ (down from 1 %) and ACAUD (down from 5%). In contrast, 
CHAUD moves from significance at 5% to 1 %. LIBorSNP suffers a reduction in the significance 
level from 1% to 5%. Changing the basis of comparison to Model 1B, the coefficient on 
LAG1 has fallen from 0.5229 to 0.3305, though still significant at 1%. LAG1 does not dominate 
Model 2B in the way that it dominates Model 1B. 
Figure 3 shows the Fixed Effects of individual councils in a graphical format. Councils are 
ranked in order of increasing Fixed Effects in Model 2B, the model with the highest explanatory 
power. These individual Fixed Effects range from 2.66 months to 10.87 months, producing a 
smooth line on the graph. The jagged line is the plot of the Fixed Effects for each council, as 
estimated in Model 2A. Councils which represent peaks on the Model 2A line are those for 
which the introduction of Lag1 in Model 2B has led to a marked reduction in their Fixed 
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Effects. In other words, the strong habit effect of untimeliness in such councils is captured by 
the lagged dependent variable, thereby lowering the Fixed Effects coefficients. 
Figure 3 
Fixed Effect for Individual Councils, 1990-91 to 1995-96 
1 8 r • — — ™~~-~-~^~-~-~~~---~^^ 
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 
Councils in order of Model 2B Fixed Effects 
It would be appealing if the Fixed Effects of each council, generated by Models 2A and 2B, 
could be interpreted as a kind of performance indicator for that council. A small Fixed Effect 
might then be considered as evidence of a good financial culture with regard to timeliness, 
and a large Fixed Effect as evidence of the converse. That would have been a reasonable 
interpretation if the Fixed Effects had been estimated on the full set of variables used in the 
OLS models (1A and 1B). 
However, Fixed Effects regressions must necessarily drop time-invariant variables. For 
example, in Model 1 A, the ONSP variable was significant at 5% and the District variable only 
just missed significance at 5%. Both had substantial negative coefficients: -1.2853 and -
1.2840, respectively. This suggests that, if these variables had not been time-invariant and 
could have been included within the Fixed Effects regressions, the Fixed Effect of a council 
exhibiting both characteristics would have been larger. Notwithstanding this qualification, 
the dispersion of Fixed Effects indicates marked differences between councils, well beyond 
the ramifications of this issue. In Model 2A, the range of individual Fixed Effects is from 3.83 
months to 16.07 months. The qualification is less important in the case of Model 2B, whose 
OLS counterpart (Model 1B) did not show the time-invariant variables as significant. 
Restricted OLS models 
It has already been explained that, in order to run the Fixed Effects regressions, it was 
necessary to remove time-invariant variables. For purposes of comparison, the OLS 
regressions have been re-run with the restricted set of variables used in the Fixed Effects 
regressions. Comparing Model 3A (OLS on restricted set of variables, with no lagged 
dependent variable) with Model 2A yields the following observations. The Adjusted R2 falls 
from 0.55 to 0.41. In terms of which variables are statistically significant, CHAUD and 
DUMMY93 lose their significance entirely, whilst DUMMY95 reduces its significance level 
from 1%to5%. 
Comparing Model 3B (OLS on restricted set of variables, with lagged dependent variable) 
with Model 2B shows that there is a much larger coefficient on LAG1 (0.5446 as opposed to 
0.3305, both significant at 1%). LIBorSNP increases its significance level (5% to 1%); AQ 
becomes significant at 5%; and DUMMY95 reduces its significance from 1% to 5%. 
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Logit models 
Table 6 reports the Logit models 4A and 4B. This constitutes an alternative approach to the 
issue of audit lag, regarding it as essentially a matter of non-compliance by individual councils 
with externally imposed deadlines. Timeliness is not valued for its own sake, but solely as a 
means of compliance. In parallel to the OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, Model 4Adoes 
not have a lagged dependent variable, whereas Model 4B does. 
Table 6 
Logit Regressions on Non-Compliance with Audit Deadlines. 
Model 4B 
Constant 
Pop91 
Dist 
ONSI 
ONSM 
ONSP 
ONSU 
LAB 
CON 
LIBorSNP 
NOC 
Polcomp 
AQ 
CSAQ 
ACAUD 
CHAUD 
CA 
Lag1 
DUMMY92 
DUMMY93 
DUMMY94 
DUMMY95 
DUMMY96 
Observations 
McFadden R2 
Chi-squared 
Variable 
0.549 
(-1.018) 
0.0004 
(-0.571) 
-0.4348 
(-1.009) 
-1.3899 
(-2.134) 
-0.1685 
(-0.159) 
-1.1983 
(-1.827) 
-0.7392 
(-1.174) 
0.9119 
(-1.323) 
2.2554 
(-2.399) 
-1.1032 
(-1.5) 
0.9241 
(-1.432) 
-0.5413 
(-1.211) 
1.0895 
(-2.998) 
0.2614 
(-0.652) 
0.6161 
(-2.291) 
-0.2773 
(-0.613) 
0.2816 
(-0.736) 
-0.061 
(-0.152) 
0.3422 
(-0.687) 
0.1698 
(-0.405) 
0.5974 
(-1.371) 
2.3873 
(-3.7) 
390 
0.1761 
82.6984 
Model 4A 
-5.0318 
(-5.227) 
0.0006 
(-0.685) 
0.0124 
(-0.024) 
-1.0319 
(-1.321) 
-1.0082 
(-0.809) 
-0.7442 
(-0.992) 
-0.5753 
(-0.784) 
1.0353 
(-1.256) 
1.9589 
(-1.913) 
-0.8995 
(-1.032) 
0.291 
(-0.381) 
0.1353 
(-0.244) 
0.146 
(-0.326) 
0.3108 
(-0.673) 
0.2344 
(-0.725) 
0.0816 
(-0.14) 
0.0348 
(-0.08) 
0.584 
-0.5639 
(-1.113) 
0.009 
(-0.014) 
0.2196 
(-0.433) 
0.7916 
(-1.517) 
2.8341 
(-3.827) 
390 
-0.3844 
180.456 
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The following variables are statistically significant in Model 4A: ONSI (unexpected negative 
sign, significant at 5%); CON (unexpected positive sign, significant at 5%); ACAUD (expected 
positive sign, significant at 5%); AQ (expected positive sign, significant at 1 %); and DUMMY96 
(expected positive sign, significant at 1%). The McFadden R2 (Maddala, 1983, p. 40), which 
replaces the conventional Adjusted R2, is 0.1761. The Chisquared statistic for the Likelihood 
Ratio Test is 82.6984, indicating that the Logit regression is significant at 1%. 
The introduction of Lag1 in Model 4B significantly alters the results. Lag1 has the expected 
positive sign, and is significant at 1%. The constant has a negative sign, significant at 1%. 
DUMMY96 has the expected positive sign, significant at 1%. However, AQ is not significant 
when Lag1 has been introduced. The McFadden R2 is 0.3844, much higher than in Model 
4A, and the Chi-squared for the Likelihood Ratio Test is 180.4560, significant at 1%. 
Table 7 
Predictive Performance of the Logit Models on Non-Compliance with Deadlines 
MODEL 4A (without lagged dependent variable) 
Actual 
0 
1 
Total 
Predicted 
0 
40 
22 
62 
1 
73 
255 
328 
Total 
113 
277 
390 
MODEL 4B (with lagged dependent variable) 
Actual 
0 
1 
Total 
Predicted 
0 
78 
27 
105 
1 
35 
250 
285 
Total 
113 
277 
390 
Table 7 reports the predictive performance of Models 4A and 4B. It should, however, be 
remembered that the Logit regressions are maximising the likelihood of observing the pattern 
of non-compliance, which is not the same as maximising predictive performance (Greene, 
1997, p. 894). Over the study period, there were 390 observations, of which 277 (71%) were 
cases of non-compliance. Model 4A correctly identified 255 (92%) noncompliants, but only 
40 (35%) compliants. It mis-classified 73 compliants as non- compliants, and 22 non-
compliants as compliant. Model 4B correctly identified 250 (90%) non-compliants, and 78 
(69%) compliants. It mis-classified 27 non-compliants as compliant. In terms of not classifying 
compliants as non-compliant, Model 4B predicts much better than Model 4A. 
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Evaluation of regression results 
The regression results provide a consistent picture, whether using OLS or Fixed Effects 
methodology on audit lag, or using Logit on non-compliance. This discussion concentrates 
on those variables for which the results are notable. 
The results for the accounting and audit variables are important. AQ is significant at 1 % in all 
four models without lagged dependent variables, notwithstanding the variation in methodology. 
AQ is also significant in Model 3B and would have been significant in models 1B and 2B if 
the significance level had been 10%. In contrast, CSAQ is not significant in any regression. 
ACAUD is significant in all four models without lagged dependent variables. In the three 
audit lag models with lagged dependent variables, CHAUD is significant, having only been 
significant in Model 2A of the three models without lagged dependent variables. The CA 
variable is not significant in any model. 
Certain of the year dummies are consistently important. DUMMY93 is significant in all the 
audit lag models except for Model 3A (where it narrowly misses significance at 5%) and 
DUMMY95 is significant in all the audit lag models. However, neither is significant in the 
Logit models. DUMMY96 is significant at 1 % in all eight models. These results are indicative 
of improvements over the base year of 1990-91, and then show the catastrophic audit lags 
of 1995-96 (the year most affected by reorganisation). 
The introduction of a lagged dependent variable attracts a large coefficient, always significant 
at 1%. When interpreting the results, it is useful to look at models both with and without the 
lagged dependent variable. Having the lag within the model improves statistical performance, 
as measured by the Adjusted R2, though it may detract from an understanding of those 
variables ultimately responsible for audit lags. 
There is a marked variation in the estimated Fixed Effects for individual councils, supporting 
the view that patterns of good or bad performance in terms of audit lag are deeply embedded. 
In the models where they can be used, the structural and demographic variables perform 
rather poorly, except for ONSP and also District, with an unexpected negative sign. There is 
evidence that political competition shortens audit lags. However, the results on the political 
control variables are mixed. It should also be noted that care is required in interpreting the 
negative coefficient, significant in all six audit lag models but not in the Logit models, on the 
LIBorSNP variable. There are few such observations and the researchers have established 
that Angus District Council, consistently one of the best performers, was also one of the best 
performers before the study period and before it became SNP-controlled. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Three points will conclude this paper. First, the empirical results for Scottish local authorities 
(where untimeliness was a chronic problem in the 1990s) are both sensible (the statistically 
significant variables make sense) and robust. Considering the variations in approach across 
models 1A to 4B, the message about audit variables and unmeasurable characteristics being 
important, and socio-demographicand political characteristics less important than expected, 
is striking. This suggests that it was not environmental factors which were the main drivers of 
variations in untimeliness, and that these are internal to the accounting and auditing system, 
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where the remedies therefore lie. For example, questions need to be asked about the 
effectiveness of the Accounts Commission over this period. There is evidence that performance 
in England improved sharply in the 1990s (Audit Commission, 1998), during a period when 
Scotland regressed, partly but not solely because of the 1996 reorganisation. 
Second, the paper has innovated methodologically, in terms of using Fixed Effects and of 
viewing audit lags both as a matter of timeliness and of non-compliance with accounting 
regulation exercised either by, or on behalf of, central government. Ironically, poor performance 
in terms of audit lags on the part of Scottish local authorities over the study period led to a 
wide dispersion of audit lags, thereby allowing the systematic application of such techniques. 
There is obvious potential for accounting regulators to use this methodology to identify which 
characteristics are associated with untimeliness, and then to concentrate regulatory effort 
on those councils predicted to be non-compliant. In the United Kingdom, without the disciplines 
exerted by ratings in US municipal bond markets (Rose, 1998), there must be other pressures 
in support of timeliness. 
Third, the researchers plan to take forward this work in two distinct ways. There will be a 
replication of the analysis for the post-reorganisation Scottish local authorities, though that 
has to wait for sufficient years of data to become available. It is already known that the 
dreadful performance of 1995-96 was repeated in 1996-97 and 1997-98, following which 
audit lags have fallen considerably. Additionally, the data which lie behind the AQ and CSAQ 
variables in this paper will be further analysed to better understand the causal factors, including 
the way in which SAS 600 (Auditing Practices Board, 1993) altered the balance between 
them. 
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